What we solve ·What happens the day this goes down?
Taskforce · Sustain
What exactly happens the day your operation fails, and who answers?
We know that if it goes down, it goes down. No one has wanted to write what happens next.
Where your operation stops, who answers at each point and what evidence you are missing to prove it.
Operational readiness diagnosticSend this page to whoever decides
Use this today, without hiring anyone
The vacation test, which is the cheapest diagnostic there is and gets done today, without anyone's help.
- Ask yourself who cannot take two consecutive weeks of vacation. Write down the names. That list is your inventory of human single points of failure, and it is usually shorter and more serious than people expect.
- For each name, write down what stops. Not what that person does: what stops if they are not there. They are different things, and the second one is what matters.
- Look for the operating manual for that and read it. If it does not exist, you already have your first gap. If it does exist, compare it against the last real incident in that area. The difference between the two is the finding.
- Ask a third party, not the owner. The service owner tends to see the documentation as more complete than it is. Ask whoever was on shift the last time it went down.
Make room for an hour this week: pick a failure scenario and sit down with four people to go through what each one would do, minute by minute. What comes out in that hour is what a formal tabletop exercise confirms later. If nobody knows who declares, who notifies and who decides, that is already your answer.
This sounds like you if
- There was a recent incident and its root cause is still open.
- There is an audit on the calendar and the scope of what they are going to ask for is still not defined.
- You inherited an operation you do not yet fully know.
How we solve it
The method, not the promise.
- The last twelve months of real incidents are read before looking at a single operating manual. The order matters.
- Single points of failure are inventoried, technical and human, and the person who is the only one who knows counts as one.
- Runbooks are checked against what actually happened, not against what they say should happen.
- The tabletop exercise is run with your team, on a scenario you choose. What fails on the table is the product.
- Priority is set by consequence and by cost of closing, not by technical severity, which is how it gets prioritized badly.
What you receive
- The inventory of single points of failure, with the role responsible for each one.
- The log of the tabletop exercise, with what failed there.
- The list of evidence an auditor would ask for and would not find today.
- A one page sheet for the committee: the three things that have to be decided.
The proof that applies here
- Operations leadership over 60,000 servers, 24/7, global scope.
- Eight years under regulatory supervision without a single audit finding.
- Mainframe generational handover executed with no service interruption.
Before you hire
This product finds and prioritizes; it does not remediate, it does not certify and it does not include 24/7 on call or response.
What you buy is that whoever reads your incidents recognizes on the second page what is going to happen to you in the next outage. That comes from having run the operation that received those calls.
Who on your team cannot take two consecutive weeks of vacation, and what stops if they are not there?
If the problem is a different one
Everything escalates, nothing gets resolved at the front line and the internal customers have already complained upstairs.
Service operation turnaround
The process already depends on the agent and nobody remembers how it was done by hand.
Agent continuity planning
They no longer ask whether we have controls. They ask whether I can prove it holds.
Operational resilience readiness