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How far can an agent go on its own, and who stops it?
The agent no longer just answers: it executes. Nobody defined how far it can go on its own.
What your agent can do on its own, what requires approval, what stops it and who answers when it acts wrongly. Built and tested with a real stop.
Agentic operation guardrailsSend this page to whoever decides
What you receive
- The inventory of agents with their real scope, not the declared one.
- The autonomy matrix by action, with thresholds.
- The stop procedure and the exception regime with its record.
- The log of the adversarial test, with the stop executed.
The proof that applies here
- 700 automated agents put into production, with their measurement.
- Change management and escalation matrix over an infrastructure of 60,000 servers.
- Eight years without findings with regulators, where the control had to be tested and not only written.
How we solve it
The method, not the promise.
- What each agent can actually touch today gets inventoried, which is not what the design says.
- The matrix gets built by action, with an economic and a consequence threshold at each level.
- Which credential each agent uses, who grants it and who revokes it gets reviewed.
- The stop points and the exception regime get built, with their record.
- It gets tested with adversarial cases and at least one real stop gets executed in controlled production.
Use this today, without hiring anyone
The autonomy matrix in its minimum version. It gets drawn on one sheet and it organizes the whole conversation.
- List the actions, not the agents. Open a ticket, approve an expense, send an email to a customer, modify a record. The unit of control is the action.
- Assign each one of four levels: executes alone, executes and notifies, requires approval, forbidden. Most organizations discover here that almost everything ended up in the first one by default.
- Put a threshold on the levels. The threshold is money or consequence: up to a certain amount it executes alone, above that a human approves. Without a threshold, the level is an opinion.
- Write down what stops it and who can stop it. With a name and with a time. "It can be stopped" is not an answer if nobody knows how.
A document becomes a control the day it gets tested. Stop it once, on purpose, in an agreed window. A stop procedure that has never been executed is a hypothesis, and the day it is needed it will be the first time.
This sounds like you if
- An agent did something nobody had authorized.
- There is a request to widen the agent's permissions and no written criterion exists to assess it.
- The agent executes actions and the real time to stop it has never been measured.
Before you hire
A well placed guardrail takes away speed and that shows from the first week: the design names that cost action by action before building it.
An agent guardrail is, at bottom, a change and escalation matrix, which is what was governed for years over sixty thousand servers. What is new is the agent; the method for deciding what executes alone and what gets stopped is not.
If you had to stop your agent right now, who does it and how long does it take?
If the problem is a different one
The regulator asks why that case was rejected and nobody can reconstruct it.
Automated decision governance
We have service accounts with privileges and nobody knows who answers for them.
Non-human identity governance
The process already depends on the agent and nobody remembers how it was done by hand.
Agent continuity planning